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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
v. 
LEMUEL T. SMALL, Case No. 900382-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. Priority No. 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant does not contest appellee's confession of error that the roadblock 
stop in this case violated the fourth amendment. However, this court should address 
the Utah constitutional issues raised in appellant's brief which are related to such 
stops. Any voluntary consent obtained as a result of the roadblock stop was invalid 
due to the lack of attenuation between the stop and the consent. Such consent was 
closely related in time to the roadblock stop. There were no intervening 
circumstances between the stop and the consent. Finally, the roadblock was 
established without legal authority and therefore constituted a flagrant violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
1 
Utah Constitution. This court need not remand the case for further factual findings. 
Rather, the conviction should be reversed and the evidence ordered suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ROADBLOCK STOP VIOLATED BOTH THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Appellee concedes that the roadblock at issue in this case fails to meet the 
requirements of the fourth amendment. Appellant does not contest this confession 
of error. However, appellee failed to address the issues raised by appellant relating 
to Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. One of those issues was decided in 
State v. Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991).1 However, this court in Sims did not 
address the issue of whether suspicionless stops are justifiable under Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. That issue was argued at length in appellant's opening 
brief and should be addressed in this case. 
1ln Sims, the court held that the officers lacked legal authority to conduct a 
roadblock. 
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POINT II 
ANY VOLUNTARY CONSENT IS INVALIDATED BY THE 
LACK OF ATTENUATION FROM THE ILLEGAL ROADBLOCK 
STOP AND THE EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO THAT 
STOP IS INADMISSIBLE. 
Appellee contends that this case must be remanded to the district court for 
factual determinations on the issues of the voluntariness of the consent and the 
attenuation of such consent from the initial violation. Additionally, appellee urges this 
court to clarify the legal standards to be applied to the determination of both of these 
issues. Based on the case law from this court and the record in this case, such a 
remand to the district court is not necessary. 
A. 
Voluntary Consent. 
Appellant concedes that the rulings from the various panels of this court on the 
standard for determining whether a consent is voluntary have not been a model of 
consistency.2 That issue may not need to be addressed in this case in light of the 
consistent rulings from this court in State v. Sims, supra; and State v. Park, 810 P.2d 
456 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 171 U.A.R. 67 (Utah, 1991), regarding the effect of a 
prior illegal stop on a subsequent voluntary consent. 
2Compare: State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Carter, 812 
P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991) and State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 1105 (Utah App.) cert. 
denied 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
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B. 
Exploitation. 
Appellee urges this court to adopt a two part analysis to determine if evidence 
seized pursuant to a voluntary consent following an illegal stop is subject to the 
exclusionary rule. The test urged by appellee would require the court to first 
determine if the consent is rendered involuntary by the temporal proximity to the 
violation, the absence of intervening circumstances, or flagrant police misconduct. 
Appellee would have, the court next determine if the initial violation was so purposeful 
or flagrant that the evidence should be excluded to deter such misconduct. The 
primary problem with this approach is that it disregards the attenuation analysis 
provided bv State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), and other courts.3 Second, 
the analysis urged by appellee is essentially a return to the pre-Arroyo standard which 
allowed a voluntary consent to violate any prior illegal seizure. That standard was 
expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In State v. Arrovo, supra, the court held that a two step analysis must be 
applied to determine the admissibility of evidence when there has been an illegal 
3United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Perez-Esoarza, 609 F.2d 
1284 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bazinet, 462 U.S. 982 (8th Cir.) cert, den. 
409 U.S. 1010 (1972); United State v. Cherry. 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 
546 (11th Cir. 1987); State v. Rasheem. 464 So.2d 293 (La. 1985): Reyes v. State, 
741 S.W.2d414(Tex. Cr. App. 1987): People v. Boraes. 69 NY.2d 1031, 511 NE.2d 
58 (1987); People v. Odom. 83 (IN. App. 3d 1022), 404 N.E.2d 997 (1980). 
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search or seizure followed by a voluntary consent. The first issue to be decided is 
whether the consent is in fact voluntary. If the consent is involuntary then the 
evidence clearly is inadmissible. If there has been a voluntary consent, the court must 
then determine if that voluntary consent resulted from the exploitation of the primary 
illegal stop. The court in Arrovo held that this exploitation issue is determined by an 
analysis of three factors: the temporal proximity of the illegal stop and the granting 
of the consent; the presence or absence of intervening circumstances; and the 
purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct. If there is a lack of attenuation, then the 
voluntary consent is rendered invalid. 
The analysis urged by appellee fails to distinguish between the issue of 
voluntariness of the consent and the issue of exploitation or attenuation of that 
consent from the primary illegality. In other words, Arrovo requires courts to first 
answer the question: "Was the consent voluntary?" If that question is answered in 
the affirmative the next question to be decided if appellee's analysis were followed 
would also be: "Was the consent voluntary?" The practical effect is that a finding 
of voluntariness would relieve the taint of the primary illegality. Such an analysis was 
explicitly rejected in State v. Arrovo, supra. The only exception to this situation 
would be that of a particularly flagrant or purposeful violation requiring deterrence of 
police misconduct. 
In support of this suggested analysis, appellee relies on the case of Florida v. 
Rover. 460 U.S. 491 (1983). In that case, the court held that an arrest made without 
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probable cause rendered a subsequent consent involuntary. Appellee asserts that 
Royer stands for the proposition that any attenuation analysis should focus on the 
voluntariness of the consent. That interpretation of Royer is wrong. The essence of 
the holding in Royer is that the circumstances of an unlawful arrest may be so 
coercive as to render a subsequent consent involuntary. Based on the finding that the 
purported consent was involuntary, the court did not have to reach the issue of 
attenuation or exploitation of the primary illegality. It is inappropriate to apply Royer 
to a determination of the attenuation or exploitation of a voluntary consent from an 
illegal stop. 
Appellee also argues that there are two approaches followed by the courts in 
applying the attenuation analysis. The first approach focuses on the relationship 
between the consent and the primary illegality. The second approach focuses on the 
police misconduct and the taint resulting from that misconduct. Appellee 
mischaracterizes this as a mechanical, or "but for" analysis. It is actually a weighing 
process. However, appellee does correctly point out that the second approach, which 
does not mix the consent and attenuation issues, has been consistently followed by 
this court's decisions subsequent to Arroyo. State v. Sims, supra; and State v. Park, 
supra. The principle of stare decisis requires this court to follow the rulings and 
analyses from those two cases. 
Both Park and Sims involved roadblocks that were indistinguishable from this 
case. There was no statutory authority to conduct the roadblocks. The roadblocks 
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were approved and organized by local law enforcement officers. Both cases involved 
voluntary consents to search that were obtained a very short time after the initial 
illegal stops. Likewise, in this case any consent was obtained with minutes of the 
roadblock stop. In both cases there were no intervening circumstances between the 
stop and the voluntary consent.4 The roadblock in this case just as the roadblock in 
Sims, was conducted without authority of law and therefore the search and seizure 
violation was purposeful and flagrant. The holding in both Park and Sims was that the 
illegal roadblock invalidated any voluntary consent by the defendant. This court 
should reach the same conclusion in this case. 
The final aspect of appellee's response that needs to be addressed is the 
request to remand the case for further proceedings in the district court to make 
factual determinations. Appellee notes that the court in Arrovo ordered such a 
disposition. However, the record of the proceedings in Arroyo did not reflect what 
had occurred between the illegal stop and the purported consent. The record in this 
intervening circumstances have been found to include such things as a release 
from custody, an appearance before the magistrate, discussions with a lawyer, or a 
conviction on an unrelated charge, United States v. Delaadillo-Velasauez, 856 F.2d 
1292 (9th Cir. 1988). Other intervening circumstances that may establish sufficient 
attenuation between the unlawful detention and the voluntary consent have been 
described in the case law: giving of the Miranda warning and allowing the defendant 
to consult with a passenger, United States v. Berrv. 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1983), 
Juarez v. State, 708 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), telling the defendant that 
he did not have to consent to the search, Reves v. State, supra, developing probable 
cause from independent sources to justify the detention United States v. Cherry. 
supra, and whether the consent was volunteered or requested, People v. Borges, 69 
N.Y.2d 1031, 511 N.E.2d 58 (1987). 
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case is indistinguishable from the facts in Sims and Park. In both of those cases, this 
court found that the lack of attenuation between the roadblock and the consent 
invalidated the voluntariness of the consent. This court is bound by the rulings in 
Sims and Park. Consequently, the appropriate action for this court is to hold that any 
voluntary consent was invalidated by the illegal roadblock and not remand the case 
for further findings. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment and conviction rendered in the lower court should be ordered 
reversed. The case should be remanded to the district court for a new trial with an 
order to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the illegal roadblock stop. 
DATED this day of December, 1991. 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Attorney for Appellant 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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